USA v. Edward Jesus-Nunez by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-13-2014 
USA v. Edward Jesus-Nunez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Edward Jesus-Nunez" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 839. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/839 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1454 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EDWARD JESUS-NUNEZ, 
                                     Appellant 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 1-10-cr-00017-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2014 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, and  
THOMPSON, District Judge.
*
 
 
(Filed: August 13, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Edward Jesus-Nunez (“Nunez”) was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment after 
pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 
                                              
*
 The Honorable Anne E. Thompson, United States District Judge for the District of New 
Jersey, sitting by designation. 
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kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  He now challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion 
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties and therefore set forth only those facts that are 
necessary to our disposition.  On January 27, 2010, a grand jury charged Nunez with, 
inter alia, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine hydrochloride and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846.  Lori J. Ulrich, Esq. was appointed to represent Nunez.  On January 29, 
2010, Nunez entered a not guilty plea before a federal magistrate judge.  
 On June 18, 2010, Ms. Ulrich, on behalf of Nunez, filed a motion to suppress 
evidence derived from a global positioning system (“GPS”) tracking device.  Law 
enforcement officers placed the GPS on Nunez’s vehicle without a warrant on or around 
February 9, 2009, and tracked his movements until his arrest on January 22, 2010.  The 
District Court denied Nunez’s motion to suppress without a hearing. 
 On November 4, 2010, Ms. Ulrich filed an unopposed motion to withdraw due to 
an alleged breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.  The District Court granted her 
motion and appointed Donald F. Martino, Esq. to represent Nunez.  Mr. Martino did not 
file any additional substantive motions on Nunez’s behalf. 
 On August 15, 2011, Nunez entered a guilty plea to the charge of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine 
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hydrochloride and 50 grams or more of cocaine base; the Government agreed to dismiss 
the remaining counts.  The plea agreement contained a 15-year term of imprisonment.  At 
the time of Nunez’s guilty plea, the District Court questioned him under oath.  Nunez 
stated that he understood the plea agreement and the Government’s description of his role 
in the offense, and that he entered his plea free from undue influence. 
 By e-mail dated May 12, 2011, the District Court notified the attorneys of its 
concerns regarding the 15-year imprisonment term.  In response, Nunez requested that 
the court refrain from formally rejecting his plea until after holding an evidentiary 
hearing on his objections to his pre-sentence report.  The District Court granted his 
request and held an evidentiary hearing on August 15, 2011.  At the hearing, Mr. Martino 
advised the Government that Nunez agreed to withdraw his objections to the pre-sentence 
report and accept a plea agreement containing an imprisonment term of 20 years, 
provided that he would be sentenced that same day.  After questioning Nunez as to the 
new plea agreement, the District Court sentenced Nunez to 20 years of imprisonment. 
 On June 26, 2012, Nunez filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in reaching the plea agreement.  Thereafter, the District Court appointed Edward 
J. Rymsza, Esq. to represent Nunez in connection with his § 2255 motion.  Mr. Rymsza, 
on behalf of Nunez, filed a supplemental motion to vacate.  On December 11, 2012, the 
court held an evidentiary hearing.  It then denied  Nunez’s motion to vacate and declined 
to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”).   
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 Nunez filed a timely notice of appeal and applied for a COA with this Court.  We 
granted a COA, limiting the appeal to the single issue of “whether counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to protect, preserve, and pursue [Nunez’s] right to 
challenge the admission of GPS evidence and its fruits.”   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. 
 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to vacate 
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 
308, 314 (3d Cir. 2002). 
III. 
 Nunez contends that his prior counsel were ineffective for failing to preserve his 
right to appeal the District Court’s admission of the GPS evidence.  
 In ascertaining the validity of a guilty plea, a court must determine whether the 
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 
open to the defendant.  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).  A defendant 
who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and intelligent 
nature of such a plea only by meeting the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 696 (1984).  See  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52 (1985).  Under the two-pronged Strickland test, the defendant must show that:  
(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) 
there is a “reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results 
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of the proceeding would have been different.”  To establish prejudice in the guilty plea 
context, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel’s errors he would insisted on going to trial.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
 Nunez asserts that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness because his counsel failed to pursue “several available options that would 
have protected and preserved the [GPS] issue for appellate review.”  Nunez Br. 10.  He 
focuses on the fact that, nine days after the District Court denied his motion to suppress 
and six months before he pleaded guilty, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia decided United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
In that case, the court held that evidence obtained from the use of a GPS without a 
warrant constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment and should have been 
suppressed.  Id.  Five months after Nunez was sentenced, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the Maynard decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).   
 Although Nunez concedes that Maynard was not binding precedent in this circuit 
and that this Court had not decided any similar cases, he argues that his counsel should 
have attempted to preserve his suppression claim in light of Maynard.  Specifically, 
Nunez asserts that counsel could have:  (1) filed for reconsideration of the suppression 
motion after Maynard was decided; (2) sought to procure a conditional guilty plea that 
preserved Nunez’s right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion; (3) requested a 
continuance of his guilty plea and sentencing in order to await a decision by the Supreme 
Court in Jones; and/or (4) attempted to secure a stipulated-facts trial.  Nunez Br. 15-19.   
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 Nunez has not demonstrated that Ms. Ulrich or Mr. Martino acted unreasonably in 
deciding not to pursue these courses of action.  In assessing whether counsel’s 
performance was constitutionally deficient, we must make every effort “to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689.  Here, Ms. Ulrich and Mr. Martino had objectively sound strategic bases 
for deciding not to file motions for reconsideration.  There was no binding precedent on 
the issue of GPS evidence at the time, and Nunez’s counsel could not have been expected 
to predict that the Supreme Court would decide Jones as it did.  Moreover, Mr. Martino’s 
decision not to pursue other options, such as a stipulated-facts trial, was objectively 
reasonable, given that Nunez had expressed his desire to enter a guilty plea. 
 In addition, Nunez has not shown that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial.”  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  Accordingly, Nunez has failed to make the showing 
required by Strickland.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
